Since FACTUM’s August review, Bureau 1440 has shown that Rassvet can do more than simply stay in orbit: the network connected real users in the Russian Arctic, the first spacecraft from the July batch reached the roughly 500 km orbital band, and the company unveiled a production-model terminal rated at up to 700 Mbps. But there is still no public evidence of a third batch launch. The question now is whether a working prototype can become a network.

FACTUM last took a close look at Rassvet on August 26. At the time, the picture looked troubling: the second batch of 16 spacecraft had spent more than a month at low altitude, several satellites were already descending, and the federal deployment schedule required a sharp acceleration in launches. Over the next six weeks, several developments changed that picture.

It has become both better for Bureau 1440 and worse for the project’s calendar. There are now the first public signs that the system can work with an actual user outside the laboratory. One satellite from the second batch has reached the altitude band where most of the first batch settled. The company has begun testing with prospective customers and shown a production-model user terminal. But the deployment cadence has not visibly accelerated: as of the morning of October 7, open sources still confirm only two batch launches of production spacecraft — one in March and one in July.

That changes the frame of the story. In July, the question was whether the talk of a “Russian Starlink” rested on real technology or on yet another expensive state showcase. The answer to the first half of that question is now much clearer. The technology exists, and it works. The problem has moved to the place where ambitious space programs often fail: serial production, launch cadence, spacecraft reliability, and the ability to turn isolated successful communications sessions into a continuous service.

The second batch was written off too soon

The August snapshot of the orbits was factually correct, but it was exactly that — a snapshot, not an outcome. By the end of August, none of the spacecraft launched on July 19 had climbed above roughly 360 km. In early September, that produced a wave of reports claiming that the entire second batch had failed to reach its working orbit.

Independent satellite observer Marco Langbroek pointed out that it was misleading to compare the second batch at 40–50 days in flight with a first batch that had already completed much more of its orbit raising. Plasma propulsion raises orbit slowly, and at a comparable point in the mission the July spacecraft were, on average, doing no worse than the March batch. By mid-September, 13 of the 16 satellites in the second batch were still gaining altitude.

On September 29, RASSVET-3 No. 29 became the first spacecraft from the July launch to reach roughly 507–508 km and stabilize there. By early October, the other maneuvering satellites in the second batch were also continuing to climb, with several clustering around 480 km before the next phase of orbital separation. The problems, however, have not disappeared: spacecraft No. 17 and No. 23 have dropped to roughly 250–280 km and face a high risk of re-entry, while No. 26 also remains well below the main group.

In other words, the claim that “all 16 failed to climb” did not survive the passage of time. But saying that “everything is nominal” would be just as misleading. One spacecraft from the first batch has already been lost, several others are lagging significantly, and at least two satellites in the second batch are clearly in trouble. For a young constellation, that does not prove systemic failure, but it directly affects the reserve margin and the rate at which the operator will have to replace losses.

There is a second conclusion as well. On July 22, FACTUM reported that the main March group appeared to be settling not at the 800 km altitude advertised on the company’s website, but at roughly 500–520 km, raising the possibility that the working architecture had been revised. The first spacecraft from the second batch has now stopped in the same band. That is still not official confirmation of a new target altitude — Bureau 1440 has not announced one publicly — but the case for a working shell around 500 km is now considerably stronger.

The most important proof came not from orbit, but from Nelmin-Nos

On September 3, IKS Holding chief executive Alexei Shelobkov told RBC that the first tests with customers had begun in August, ahead of the company’s internal schedule. He said key customers had already been given an opportunity to try the service, and that the first terminal had been installed on Russian Railways rolling stock.

Two weeks later came the first public use case involving ordinary users. On September 19, in the Arctic settlement of Nelmin-Nos in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, a Bureau 1440 satellite terminal provided internet access for remote electronic voting. Voters used a tablet connected over Wi-Fi, while the terminal itself communicated with the low-Earth-orbit satellites. The company reported the experiment, and regional media independently confirmed that it took place.

For the project, that matters more than an impressive throughput figure measured on a bench. The experiment shows that the entire chain can function: satellite, radio link, ground infrastructure, user terminal, and a real internet service. That is precisely the kind of evidence that was missing when FACTUM examined in July whether Bureau 1440 was a real system or a technological simulacrum.

But the test should not be overread. The company did not publish independent measurements from Nelmin-Nos for speed, latency, the length of the available communications window, or link stability. The operator itself describes such sessions as tests. One successful user scenario proves that the communications chain works; it does not prove continuous coverage. A 24/7 service requires not a demonstration, but a dense orbital constellation.

Rassvet now has a production-model user terminal

On October 6, Bureau 1440 showed an expanded lineup of ground equipment for the first time. The headline product is the 1440.ULTRA. The company describes it as a production-model user terminal and claims data rates of up to 700 Mbps. It measures 600×600 mm, weighs 30% less than the pre-production version, and is rated to IP67. The terminal is intended both for fixed installations — including remote industrial sites and construction projects — and for use while moving.

The company also showed the 1440.MINI, for now only a concept. Its stated dimensions are 300×300 mm and its target speed is around 100 Mbps. Bureau 1440 envisions it as a portable communications device for rescue teams, emergency services, and expeditions; no production date has been announced.

A third device, 1440.ZEMLYA, is designed for rail transport and is already being tested on Russian Railways rolling stock. The developer claims stable data transmission at train speeds of up to 400 km/h. It is part of the broader program to connect long-distance trains as well as Lastochka and Sapsan services.

The word “production” needs a qualification here. It means that 1440.ULTRA has moved beyond the pre-production prototype stage as a product. It does not mean that Rassvet satellite internet is already available to mass-market customers. Tariffs, the retail price of the terminal, and a date for open customer sign-ups have not been announced; the company still places commercial service launch in 2027.

Even so, the ground segment is no longer a secondary part of the presentation. Starlink became a mass-market system not simply because SpaceX learned how to launch many satellites, but because thousands of user terminals, manufacturing, logistics, and automatic handover between spacecraft appeared alongside them. Bureau 1440 is now publicly demonstrating that it is building that second half of the system as well.

The schedule, however, has only grown tighter

Here, the progress of recent weeks changes very little. Under the federal project passport for “Internet Access Infrastructure,” as reported by ComNews, 156 Rassvet-3 satellites are supposed to be in orbit by the end of 2026. After the second launch in July, 32 production spacecraft had been placed in orbit; one satellite from the first batch had already re-entered by then. In early August, ComNews calculated that meeting the year-end target would require another 125 spacecraft across seven launches.

More than two months have passed. As of October 7, there is still no public confirmation of a third batch launch. Open catalogues and the project’s own communications continue to show the same two production batches — March 23 and July 19. Fewer than three months remain in the year, while the gap between the actual number of spacecraft launched and the federal target has not narrowed.

At first glance, that appears to contradict Shelobkov’s statement that the project is running “somewhat ahead of schedule.” In fact, the two claims may refer to two different schedules. In his RBC interview, Shelobkov was speaking primarily about customer testing milestones, which did begin earlier than the planned September window. The federal project passport measures something else: the physical number of satellites in orbit. The company may be ahead of its own internal schedule on user trials while still running behind the state timetable for constellation deployment.

On September 24, Bureau 1440 deputy chief executive Dmitry Agafonov said the company was already developing a new generation of spacecraft and refining the current one using data from real customer tests. For a young system, that is normal engineering evolution. But it also shows that the architecture is not yet frozen: the operator is simultaneously deploying its first production constellation, learning from its behavior, and designing the next generation.

The military dimension is no longer purely theoretical

In FACTUM’s July analysis of Russia’s dependence on Starlink, and in the later Bureau 1440 review, we made a careful distinction: the system’s potential dual use was obvious, but there was then no public evidence that it had actually been integrated into Russia’s military communications network.

Since the August article, the first specific public attribution of such use has appeared. Ukrainian military intelligence told Janes that by late July it had observed Russian forces using the first group of Rassvet satellites for satellite communications over Ukraine for “several hours.” An intelligence representative suggested that the capability could eventually be used for real-time data transmission and for reconnaissance and strike drones.

That is an important claim, but it is not independent proof. Janes is reporting information supplied by one side in the war; the article does not provide open technical evidence that would allow a specific military communications session to be independently verified. The accurate formulation is therefore no longer “no one has claimed military use,” but rather this: Ukrainian intelligence now explicitly alleges military use, while the claim remains unverified in public technical data.

Kyiv has also begun applying political and regulatory pressure to the project. Reuters reported on September 30 that Ukraine was asking the United States to sanction entities and individuals supporting the development of Rassvet. On October 6, the International Telecommunication Union confirmed to ComNews that it had received a formal request from Ukraine’s foreign ministry to exclude Ukrainian territory from the declared service areas of the Rassvet-1 and Rassvet-3 networks across all frequency bands.

A letter to the ITU cannot technically “switch off” satellites over Ukraine. It is part of the international frequency-coordination process and, at the same time, another way to create legal and sanctions-related costs around the project. But the request itself shows that Rassvet is no longer being treated as a distant industrial program. It is being treated as infrastructure that an adversary wants to constrain before mass commercial deployment begins.

What remains of our July verdict

In FACTUM’s July assessment, the conclusion was that Bureau 1440 was not a simulacrum — but neither was it a ready replacement for Starlink. By October 7, both halves of that judgment have become stronger.

“Not a simulacrum,” because there are now more than satellites, laboratory demonstrations, and corporate promises. There are customer trials, a public communications session involving real users, the first July spacecraft in the roughly 500 km orbital band, railway testing, and a production-model user terminal that has been shown publicly.

“Not a ready replacement,” because Starlink is defined neither by the peak speed of one terminal nor by one successful communications session. It is continuous coverage, deep redundancy across the constellation, frequent launches, mass terminal production, and the ability to replace failed spacecraft quickly. Rassvet still has only two confirmed production launches of 16 satellites each; some spacecraft are lagging or losing altitude, while the state’s year-end target still requires well over a hundred more satellites.

The central question facing the project has therefore changed. In July, it was reasonable to ask: does this thing actually fly? By October, the answer is yes — it flies, and it can already deliver data to a user. The harder question now is whether Russian industry can manufacture, launch, and sustain enough spacecraft and terminals for an isolated successful connection to become a network.

That is why the third batch launch will matter more than the next presentation. Then the fourth. After that, it will become possible to see whether the second batch holds its working altitude, how many spacecraft are lost, how the railway trials perform, and when the operator announces pricing and access terms. Until those questions are answered, 700 Mbps is a serious technical claim — but it is not yet a Russian Starlink.

This article is based on open sources available as of October 7, 2026.